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The crisis of the Missiles in Cuba :
twenty years late r
The crisis of the missiles in Cuba
gave rise to a large set of analisi s
also in the strategic field as wel l
as in the field of international po-
licy. Twenty years later, interest
and even polemics raise between
sections close at -one time during
the last two decades in the elabo-
ratión of foreign policies in the
U.S . An example for this is the
«actualized» treatment of this cri-
sis by experts of the sub j ect such
as Robert McNamara, Georges Ken-
nan and others .
The shown interest among the
specialists for the study of the cri-
sis comes from the characteristic s
wich carne together : given the cen-
tral part contributed to the nuclear
capacity of the two parts in the
conflict, the crisis exemplifies per-
fectly the bipolar character of the
international system .
The policy of prestige, inherent
in the move developed by a big
power, plays a central part in cau-
se and final development of the
crisis . The characteristics of the
*negociating game undertaken in a
hidden way between the two bi g
powers in an atmosphere derived
from the habits of the cold wa r
will give place to the «diplomacy
of bipolarity» .
The installation of the red telex
and the new atmosphere of coexis-
tence between the «super-bigs »
prove it .
The part of irracionality, derived
from the nuclear element, central
during the crisis, poses doubts con-
cerning the capacity of any state
to realize an effective defense . The-
refore a climate of relative secu-
rity between the two bigs and far
the states in their entirety its esta-
blished . A substantial climate, as
the crisis exemplifies and as we
shall experience late, for an inter-
national system based on predomi-
nance of the two powers whos e
force derives from an «irrational »
factor : the nuclear over-capacity.
Contentious with Morroco and the strategi c
future of Spai n
In spite the fact that the admis-
sion of Spain into NATO will mean ,
for the gouvernement, the «officia-
lisation» of a new «enemy», the
Varsovia Pact, it's true that orto-
doxy of the Spanish foreign polic y
has been, and is still, to regard
Morrocco as the only country with
which Spain can have, hypotheti-
cally, an armed conflict . Of the
contentious that both countrie s
have established the most impor-
tant and tenszon .-producing is that
which stems from the sovereignty
of Ceuta and Melilla, Spanish terri-
tories claimed by Morrocco.
The ob jective of the study is the
analysis of the circumstances sur-
rounding this contentious, consider- 
ing specially those factors that 
merge in the Morroccan position. 
In this sense there are five funda- 
mental aspects which together con- 
dition the Morroccan position and 
explain, in large part, the essence 
of what way be the immediate fu- 
ture. The consensus of the people 
and of the political forces of Mor- 
rocco, aggravated by the war of 
the Sahara and which place this 
country in a context of permanent 
instability, close relations with the 
U.S. that openly supports the poli- 
cy of Hassan; the accelerated pro- 
cess of rearmament that Morrocco 
has followed since the begining of 
the 70's and, finally, the Hassan 11's 
pretentions convert the kingdom 
of Morrocco into a country which 
is a regional leader or ,a police 
state. 
Before this Morroccan panorama 
is an ambiguous Spanish foreign 
policy a fruit of the lack of a global 
vision in this region and of the 
inability of the Spanish political 
and intellectual class to understand 
the process of Morroccan national 
affirmation. Lamentably, the point 
of view which is favoured in Spain 
is centered basically on viewing the 
neighbour country as a ccpotential 
theat)), with an awareness of its 
military more than of its political 
characters. Repeatedly the mater 
of Ceuta and Melilla has been sin- 
gled out as the one serious problem 
that Spain has in area of foreign 
defense, without concerning the re- 
duced vision that political treat- 
ment would require to reduce or 
eradicate the bellicose aspects and 
connotations of the problem. In 
any case, both countries seem to 
take a hopeful stand; the resolu- 
tion of the contentious is based on 
the diplomatic outcome which will 
derive from the decolonization of 
Gibraltar. It's a logical position, 
certainly, but one which retards in- 
necessarily the adoption of politi- 
cal ,and cultural mesures and which 
would make impossible the escala- 
tion of tension due to the Spanish 
holdings on the African coast. 
Indispensably, this treat of a con- 
flict to which it's not possible to 
apply a typical solution of a Stand- 
ard pattern of resolution, given 
that both countries have substan- 
tia1 arguments to uphold their po- 
sitions. But it's precisely, as a re- 
sults of this, of the existence of ar- 
guments, by which it will be pos- 
sible to begin a broad dialogue, 
deemotionalising the polemic pre- 
sent and accepting the fact that 
both countries have a right to 
maintain their criteria. For both 
countries, the soIution for this 
point of contentious would bring 
great advantages, political as well 
as economic and cultural. For 
Spain, speaking concretly, insol- 
ving the problem the hypothesics 
of theat would be left reduced to . 
nothing, which would results in a 
radical reformulation of str,ategic 
plans and which would effect, wit- 
hout risks, a gradual and exempla- 
ry process of demilitarization and 
disarmament. 
Use of armed force and 
Falklands-Malvinas case 
Use of force is still used as a na- 
tional policy to01 when the other 
part in the conflict is hoped not 
to react or to be crushed by under 
a total attack (as in the Irak-Iran 
case). There is a worrying tendency 
to maintain that these armed ac- 
tions are in defense of the law, in 
a sui generis resurrection of the 
bellum iustum doctrine. The efforts 
to reinforce the Principle of prohi- 
bition of the use or threat of force, 
as the special Committee created 
in 1977 for this task seem painfully 
useless if there is not an alternati- 
ve method for solving the disputes. 
And the pacific solutions as nego- 
tiation are very difficult to imple- 
ment due to the very logic of the 
strategic system: the coexistence 
of two Super-Powers tend to exa- 
cerbate the tensions favoring one 
of the parts. 
The Malvinas-Falkland Case is 
atypical in this general scheme: 
both parts were siding the U.S.A.; 
the dispute did not affect any vital 
or strategic interest of the United 
Kingdom. Why war? 
It might be sustained with sound 
reasons that the legal sovereignnity 
over the islands belonged to Argen- 
tina, and that U.K. titles are poor, 
as has been recognized even by 
high diplomats o£ the Foreign Of- 
fice; the main and undoutable fact 
was her pacific possession O£ the 
islands for 150 years. But adquisi- 
tive prescription, when protested 
by the other part as Argentina al- 
ways did, is not a title by itself. 
Nationalistic claim of the Malvi- 
nas was a way of keeping national 
unity between all the political 
groups of a progresively impooring 
and decaying country; and Argen- 
tina Government exploited this fee- 
ling. Great Britain's attitude helped 
to the growing impatience among 
Argentinians. 
London tried to put p,aramount 
the kelpers' rights over the wishes 
of Buenos Aires, maintaining that 
it was a case of self- determina- 
tion, and kelpers desired to keep 
their status in connexion with Uni- 
ted Kingdom. U.N. practice, howe- 
ver, as in Gibraltar's case, has sho- 
wed that the General Assembly be- 
lieved that small enclaves, with im- 
ported population, were a case of 
territorial integrity and not of self- 
determination, and only interests, 
and not right of these populations 
should be respected. Rights of the 
neighboring country were para- 
mount. But London did not accept 
this point of view and footdragged 
negotiations for 17 years. 
The strategic situation of the 
Falkland, controlling the Southern 
traffic of goods between Atlantic 
and Pacific, the 1991 end of the Pa- 
nama Treaty, the potential wealth 
of oil, krill and polinodules have 
favorised ccconspir,ative,, explana- 
tions, suggesting U.S.A. participa- 
tion in the outbreak of the inva- 
sion, due to its interest in a mili- 
tary base in the islands. Anyway, 
interna1 factors of the collapsing 
economy of Argentina. 
The political pressure over the 
Junta, and in United Kingdom the 
desire of Mrs. Thatcher to show to 
the electorate her strength ,and to 
rally on the Faklands' case all the 
factions of the Conservative Party 
are, in muy opinion, the main fac- 
tors that have caused this old- 
fashioned war. 
Mexico: Crisis and new Gouvern Ment 
What will be shown here is that 
Mexico goes through ,a deep crisis 
of its development model following 
the pattern of accumulation of 
existing capital, a crisis which ra- 
diates in the critica1 situation of 
the world's capitalist system, of 
which its forms part as a country 
on the periphery of dependent ca- 
pitalism. 
This present conjuncture is the 
results of a process turning around 
an oligopolical domination of pro- 
duction with predominance of the 
big bank capital, related to a pro- 
cess of accumulation of capital 
strongly dependent on foreign 
countries. To this must be added a 
diagram of political domination ba- 
sed on the bureaucratic state su- 
bordination of waste organized sec- 
tors of urban and rural workers. 
In a brief pursuite of some of 
the principale variable of the eco- 
nomic and social structure during 
the last years of the 70'es we can 
observe its cleary differing char,ac- 
ter. Mexico, land of manifold ri- 
chese; with a spectacular increa- 
sement of oi1 production and ex- 
port, has a medium rate of rise 
in value, but an inflation which is 
much higher. The commercial defi- 
cit of the country is increasing and 
foreign investments are placed in 
strategic sectors of industry, at the 
same time as it is decapitalizing 
and salaries are loosing purchasing. 
In this same y e ~ s  alternative 
projects are going tc be outlined 
with regard to the so?iety model 
wanted. On one hand, the impresa- 
rial, neoliberal, relatively homoge- 
neous and always gaining more 
space in civilized society, approach- 
ing to the centres of political po- 
wer. On the other hand popular 
projects which in some way or 
another set up the need to streng- 
ten the state and to increase the 
presence of the workers organized 
in it. In 1977 a political electoral 
reform takes place which permits 
a high presence of oppositional par- 
ties in the legislative power on a 
federal and state level. The main 
Parties are registered and channel 
theis activities into established, le- 
gal ways. So it comes to the presi- 
dential and legislative federal elec- 
tion in July 1982, where is confir- 
med that the gouvernement party, 
PRI, goes on controlling fully the 
political state machinery. It  is to 
stress that these elections are reali- 
sed while the country goes through 
a deep crisis, pointed since the fall 
of the oi1 price in June 1981. Me- 
xic0 decapitalizes quickly, there 
are big capital escapes, the banks 
is only oriented on the Dollar and 
speculates, etc. In February and 
August big devaluations take place 
and in September the banking is 
nationalized and exchange control 
established. 
The views for the new gouvern- 
ment which takes up its duties in 
December 1982 are not very favo- 
rable and surely it will find itself 
forced to reformulate the present 
model with a large ccracionalitya in 
the management of the public cau- 
se, trying to move between running 
the economic crisis and running 
the social conflict. The big obliga- 
tions of the foreign debt, the 
strong inequality in the distribu- 
tion of the national income, the 
compromises signed with the FMI, 
the pressure of the social mouve- 
ment, etc., are some of the big cha- 
llenges which are to face in sight 
of the immediate future. 
Europe in the conquest of space (I) 
The initiation of the operational 
phase of the rocket Ariane, in spite 
of its last minutes troubles, sho- 
wed for the first time to the inter- 
national public opinion the inten- 
sivity of the labour realized since 
1975 by the European Sp,ace Agen- 
cy (ESA). The famous American 
weekly magazine aTime~ could af- 
firm that, for the first time Wes- 
tern Europe is able to defy the 
condominiom of space of the So- 
viets and the Americans. 
In the last seven years, the Euro- 
pean Space Agency has completed, 
pending on the last corrections, 
the programme Ariane-I, which pro- 
vides the eleven states of the ESA 
of an own satellite shuttle able to 
compete with the Soviet and Ame- 
rican rockets in laying satellites in 
orbit around the Earth. I t  has co- 
llaborated in the American Space 
programme Post-Apollo fabricating 
the Spacelab which will tr,avel in 
the Space Shuttle, actually tuned 
up in the United States. The ESA 
has also realized noumerous satelli- 
te shuttle of scientific satellites 
and satellites of application (me- 
teorological, telecommunication, et- 
cetera). 
The actual European presence in 
space conquest is the result of mo- 
re than two decades of efforts ini- 
tiated in 1960 and 1961 by the 
works which, in 1962, lead to the 
constitution of the ESRO (Euro- 
pean Space Research Organization) 
and the ELDO (European Launcher 
Development Organization), both 
organizations preceding the actual 
ESA. 
The efforts of the ESRO and the 
ELDO, which had different luck, 
lead to the union of the European 
Space Conference, which took pla- 
ce in Brussels in December 1972 
where the successes and failures 
obtained till that moment, were 
revised and the bases of a new 
European policy in the field of 
space were setled. 
